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Being a Teacher� of Lawyers: Discerning
the Theory of My Practice
by
HOWARD LESNICK*

¥/hen I first expressed interest in participating in this symposium, I
described the Essay I wanted to write as one speaking to the question,
what can teachers contribute to practitioners that will be responsive to
the reality of their work lives in engaging with issues of professional

sponsibility

and

professional

subordinated people.

identity

in

practice

on

re

behalf

of

Having on that basis ensnared the interest of the

symposium's organizers, I find that to address the question I need to be
more explicit than I have heretofore been about what it means (to me) to
"teach," in particular, to teach people who are or are becoming lawyers.
I have long been dissatisfied with the prevalent notion of teaching.
That notion, I believe , is that what we are doing is transmitting some of
our acquired knowledge and skills, which will be useful to our students in
their careers.

scholarship),

'vVe have the knowledge (provided that we .keep up our
our s t u de n ts

need it, and in teaching we "impart" what we

havt to them. In describing this concept, Robert Bellah has used

a

meta

phor that I, and many of the students with whom I have shared it over
the years, find distressingly familiar: "The pervasive emphasis on (this]
instrurne:ntal use of knowledge has tended to make of the university

a

kind of universal filling station where students tank up on knowledge

they ',viii 'need' later." 1
':'

Jeti'erson B. Fordimm Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.

based

on a

talk given at

a

symposium entitled "Theoretics of Practice:

This Essay is

The Integration of

Progre:;sive Thought and Action," sponsored by the Hastir1gs Law Journal, the I-iastings Wo

mm's Law Journal, and the Committee on Clinical Scholarship of the Association of Ameri

can

Ls.w Schools ComrniHee on Clinical Education.
I

am

grateful to Carolyn Schodt for (once again) helping me to develop my perception of

the reaching and practice of law by sharing with me her profound understanding and insight

abm;t the teaching and practice of nursing.
1.

Robert N. Beilah, The New Religious Consciousness and the Secu l a r University.

DAEDALUS, Fall

1974,

at 110, 110, quoted in ELIZABETH

LA\.VYER: i\ HUi\lANISTlC PERSPECTIVE

DVORKIN

ET

AL.,

BECOMING

ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM

(1981).
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I find this approach woefully deficient. It trivializes both knowledge
and the utility of knowledge, first by overvaluing its utilitarian over its
intrinsic worth, then by focusing on narrowly instrumental measures of
utility while losing sight of the deeper value of knowledge (whether it be
knowledge of legal doctrine, skills, history, or theory) as a means to
greater understanding of the world and of oneself. By seeking to justify
present choices in terms of the future, it excessively dichotomizes the
present and the future, thereby gravely disserving students' capacity to
learn to live integrated lives. 2

I t both inflates and cabins, in troubling

ways, the work of the teacher: by exaggerating the value of expertise and
authority, it denigrates and inhibits the self-teaching capacities of stu
dents; at the same time, it tends to render "off limits" a teacher's motiva

tion to engage more than the analytic or argumentative powers of his or
her students. It delegitimates the authentic expetience and motivation of
many teachers by fostering a view of research and scholarship as aug
menting, and of teaching and other student-oriented work as depleting, a
teacher's "human capital," thereby helping to erect a destructive conflict

o:f interest between teacher and student.

It gives students an implicit

model of the professional relation that encourages them to adopt a com
parably

crippling

view of the attorney-client relation, and an implicit

model of political life that is profoundly antidemocratic and justificatory
of

inequality.

Most fundamentally, it reifies both teacher and student, in

that it abstracts their roles as teachers and students from their individual
id;-::ntities; it uses people to teach things,

not recognizing (as a wise friend

long ago said to me) that teaching is using things to teach people.
"L\ central prop of the prevailing approach is the fear that its rejec
tion must entail the illegitimate indoctrination or coercion of students, or
a

repellent and self-defeating preaching

to (or at) them.

I agree that this

polar consequence is both illegitimate and self-defeating. I acknowledge,
too, that these concerns need to be taken seriously. Students can easily
accept

(or reject) a teacher's values or world

view more as a result of the

traditional teacher-student role dynamic than out of any sense of the stu
de:nfs emergent sense of self.
But I cannot accept as axiomatic the implicit assertion that we must
choose between polar vices.
choice

as

I regard submission to such a limit on

vvhat, in an analogous context, K have termed "an act of cosmic

d·::spair."3 I repeat those words here because I think it

important to rec

o;:;nize tha{ the effort to which I want to give voice in this Essay is an act
2.
'

S::!! Howard Lesnick, Comment, in DVORKIN ET AL., supra note i, at
l-Ioward Lesnick, Legal Education's Concern with Justice:

(;;�.·;_'. ��5 J. LEGAL Eouc.

414,419 (1985).

88, 88-89.

A Conversation with a

ft
I!

I
i
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of hop,::, a refusal to surrender to despair. This effort rests in part on the
perception that the traditional view contains an element of despair, sel

dom acknovvledged and almost never confronted squarely, that accounts
for

significant portion of the weariness and cynicism that too often af

a

our

fEct

profession.

Cvriously enough, the theory of teaching that I want to articulate is
embedded in one aspect of the etymology of the word, educate: it is de
rived from the Latin word, educere, to draw out something latent. To
me, it revolutionizes the idea of teaching to think of it as bringing out
something that is in a student, rather than putting something in that the
student lacks. '�Nhen Socrates demonstrated in the

Meno

that the slave

boy "knew" that "the square on the diagonal of a square is double its
area,

"4

to

me he

was

demonstrating, not the latency of some forgotten

prenatal knowledge, nor his own ability to ask leading questions , but the
latent ability to t ransfo rm oneself that is constitutive of being human. 5
There is somewhere
best I

can

a

magnificent line of Albert Schweitzer's, which (as

remember it) says, there is a physician within each of us, and

the practice of medicine is the art of bringing out the physician in the
sick person.
To draw out of students what is latent inside them, teachers must, I
believe, put more of ourselves into our engagement with the subject m at
ter of

our

teaching.6 At the same time, we must struggle to do this in a

way that encourages
responses tu

us

our

students to look for more of themselves in their

and to the subject matter. I want to say something about

each branch of this teacher-student dyad.
That :t do not :find the path wholly unmarked is in large measure due
to Roger Cramton.

Consider these thoughts of his:

5ince my thesis is that ultimate questions need to be discussed in
lmv school, it is only fair that I reveal my tentative and halting views
4.

PLATO, A1ENO, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 370 (Edith

5.

To Socrs.tes, rhc: fact that the boy, ignorant of geometry, could be led to understand

Hamilton & .Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).

the relation between the length of a side of a square and its area proved that "learning" was the
recalling to

awau;ness

id. at 3 70-71.

of kno·wledge that the immortal soul had acquired in earlier lives. See

'What this reasoning (taken literally) demonstrates to me is the prenatal exist

ence of l"k7rtonian thinking.

That

b.

For example, fo:· most of my teaching career my primary interest has been labor 1a.v:.

'>.Yas so,

I believe, not merely because it was an interesting, ever-changing fieid or a "hot"

subject in 1960, 1Nhen I began to teach law.

My attraction to the subject is embedded in my

belief in the centP.lity Jf work to the meaningfulness of human life and the viability of demo
cratic values. '{:t a.ny manifestation of this belief in my classes was probably wholly implicit.

For

ness

a

1 <.J. .:e c;·:,:J par:ial :>,cknowledgrnent of the connection, see Howard Lesnick, The Conscious
Work and th� Vc7lues ofAmerican Labor Law, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1933) (reviewing

JAMES 2. :\·ru::sor·;, V.·\LUES

AND

ASSUMPTIOi'o'

IN

AMERiCA'! LABOR LAW

(!983)).
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Who am X? What am I doing here?

\Vhat should I do with my life? There is a risk in opening oneself in
this manner, but one encouraging belief of mine is that trust in others
and acceptance of oneself is a crucial predicate of meaningful moral
discourse. Hence I believe-a belief itself worthy of analysis and criti
cism-that the effort to be self-consciously critical about our operating
assumptions requires us to reveal our most deeply held beliefs....
What do I profess?

Here I am, a struggling pilgrim, beset by

doubts and anxieties, painfully aware of my own limitations and fail
ures.

Even Moses, when God called to him out of the burning bush,

replied that he was not adequate to the task of bringing the Jc:wish
people out of bondage. "But who am I," Moses said, "that I should
[do these great deeds).... I am [unworthy] and slow and hesitant in
speech." And God replied: "Who is it that gives man speech? Is it not
I? . . . Go now; I will help your speech...." Well, God has not
spoken to me, so I cannot rely on a vivid and overpowering personal
experience. I have had to figure things out for myself as best I could,
evaluating those parts of my cultural and religious traditions that
seemed most relevant, consistent, and truthful.
My own tentative formulation builds on traditional Judea-Chris
tian ideas of "faith, hope and charity" as well as the idea of justice.
My basic faith is in the goodness of creation and the sacredness of
many things but especially the human spirit.

These ideas, consistent

with my experience and reflection, lead me to believe that human life
has meaning and purpose....
Love and justice ... are two faces of the same ultimate reality.
Love is a special problem in today's law school. ...
"Love" carries connotations of both sexual iove and a shallow,
We have no word that embodies a
committed ':Oncern for commonweal, whether the social unit is the
family or a neighborhood or the workplace or the nation or the
other-oriented do-goodism ....

world....
There is something more: to being a fuliy developed human being
than atomistic selfishness-v;hen each seeks to advance oneself, one's
tribe, or one's genes at the expense of others, of society, or of nature.
Even though we may experience it only rarely, love is a reality that,
like truth, can build communities that are fully human. In an ultimate
sense, both love and justice come from a source beyond us a trans
forming, ennobling source that some c:all God. Love and justice are
gifts that come to us by grace; they are not things given by government
or institutional arrangements, although fully human people can help
by giving them to each other. Law, the efforts of la•Nyers, and the
chancter of our social and legal arrangements can further them or
frustrate them. In this view, love and justice CJre relz.tcd: justice must
-

I

April
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always be informed by love if it is to be just; and love must always meet

the demands of justice if it is to be loving. 7
What 1 take Cramton to be saying, and what I want to say, is that
our teaching should be informed by our own ongoing engagement with
the questions: "vVho am I? What am I doing here? What should I do
with my life?" That Cramton's response to these questions may not be
yours, or mine, does not undermine his thesis that the questions need to
be asked.8 Nor does Cramton (or I) present this response as a proposed
set of lecture notes; he was speaking, not to a class, but to members of a
student religious organization. Finding ways in which our emergent re
sponses to the se questions can be manifested in our classrooms is a com
plex and challenging task.

vVhat is clear to me is that neither our

engagement with the questions nor our responses should be suppressed as
an irrelevant or an intrinsically illegitimate input to our teaching.
It is not easy-it has not been easy for me-to engage with these
questions.

I have had to bear in mind that responses are not quickly

packageable, in the classic classroom or courtroom manner. I also have
had to come to understand that the process of asking fundamental ques
tions need not be unavoidably bound up with authoritarian religion or
Cramton carefully prefaced his thoughts with the

iotalitarian politics.

acknowledgment that they derive from his own "religious and cultural
traditions" and that "the argument from authority is the weakest of all
arguments--a good starting point, perhaps, but only that.

Every belief

must be tested by one's experience, evaluated for consistency with other
beliefs that one has found

useful

and reliable, and compared with con

trasting views. "9 Certainly, we must continually monitor our tendency
to confuse deeply held values and beliefs with the truth.
time,

we

ac k n owledge

can

that our beliefs are

At the same

c o ntes table

·without

thereby surrendering our bases for holding them and shaping our lives by
them.

\Ve

can

reject the idea of unquestionable authority; we can steer

clear of the hazard of presenting ourselves as such an authority; and we
can yet retain and acknowledge the wellsprings of our iden tity. 1 0 In that

7.

Roger C. Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion,

(1987) (bracketed
8.

LEGAL Eouc. 509,

516-!8

1 do not '."Y,mt to allow the importance of recognizing the truth of the statement in the

text to distance my:;elf from Roger Cramton's answer.
tion, '>Visdom. and beauty.

own.

Cramtcm, s11pm
10.

37 J.

words in original) (footnotes omitted).

I find it a constant source of inspi!·a

If God did not help his speech. he does remarkable V>'ork on his

note

7, at 515.

In 2.c!dition t-J Cramton's discussion, id. at 5 i 4-15, I have found the work of Katha

rine B?.rdet< and Emily Fmvler Hartigan especially helpful to this effort. See Katharine Bart

len, F.?J»inil"! Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 880-84

(1990); Emily

Fow!er Hartigan,

1100

[Vol.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

43

:regard, I (and some of my students) have benefited from this classic ad
monition of George Fox:
You will say, Christ saith this, and the apostles say this; but what
canst thou say?11

1 hese words remind me that the difficulty of freeing one's mind from the
objectionable coercion of authority (of the merely powerful as well as the
divine) is in part a product of internalized, and not merely external,
constraints.
Recall too that, although Cramton does not shrink from speaking of
love, and of God, his subject is teaching law.

He refuses, as I want to

refuse, to cabin the role of "lawyer" or "teacher" narrowly off from his
personhood, recognizing the ways in which our deepest identities inform
our professional identity. We need to discern the existence of a link be
tween our responses to questions of professional choice and our most
fundamental world views. Kenneth Penegar, in articulating the "pillars
of professionalism" that shaped the

bility,

Model Code of Professional Responsi

gave voice as well to what he termed a "competing visionary ideal"

faintly observable in some aspects of the
not avow it as

Model Code. Although he did
his vision, he articulated it in words of extraordinary sensi

tivity and discernment, words to which I would happily subscribe:
In the society of the competing visionary ideal, there is a shared
consciousness wide enough to maintain the individual as primary
moral agent and at the same time hold to a concrete sense of commu
nity .... Human cooperation is facilitated in a variety of ways and not
predominantly through bargained exchange. The definition and place
of roles, especially vocational and professional ones, are tentative and
less influential than within the dominant vision.

The individual's

moral autonomy is prominent and not obscured by role and status.
The democratic ideal is prominent in discourse about the complete
range of associations and not limited to merely governmental issues.
The possibilities of social experiment are consciously encouraged, and
the fo:cms of society needed to shape the good are recognized as unfin
ished and immanent, still to be expressed, fully discovered and
attempted.12

Penegar recognized that this "competing ideal," expressed as it is in
the borderland of professional and "personal" or "political" value sys
tems, rests on still

more

fundamental beliefs. Hear his quotation of some

The Power of Language Beyond Words: Law as Invitation. 26 1-IARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 67,
70-74 (1991).

11.

( 1831 ).
12.

92

Testin1ony of Margaret Fox, in THE WoRKS OF GEORGE Fox 1:50 (AMS Press 1975)

Fox

v.;as

the founder of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers).

Kenneth Penegar, The Fiv:? Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 307, 391-

( 1938)

(footnote omitted).

April
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concluding passages from Robert Bellah and his associates' recent study
of contemporary America, Habits of the Heart:
Perhaps life is not a race whose only goal is being foremost. . . .
Perhaps . .. there are practices of life, good in themselves, that are
inherently fulfilling.

Perhaps work that is intrinsically rewarding is

better for human beings than work that is only extrinsically rewarded.
Perhaps enduring commitment to those we love and civic friendship
toward our fellow citizens are preferable to restless competition and
anxious self-defense.

Perhaps common worship, in which we express

our gratitude and wonder in the face of the mystery of being itself, is
the most important thing of all. If so, we will have to change our lives
and begin to remember what we have been happier to forget.
We will need to remember that we did not create ourselves, that
we owe what we are to the communities that formed us . . . .13

What I aspire, then, to present more fully to my students is

myself

as a teacher and a lawyer, to share some of the aspirations for the

made them (at

teacher-student and attorney-client relations that have

times) seem a fit context in which to live my life. My goal is in part an

instrumental one. It is to invite my students to ask themselve s 'Nhat be

ing a lawyer means, or can come to mean, to them. So, in teaching Pro
fessional Responsibility, I use the "law of lawyering"-both doctrinal
development and theoretical critiques-to evoke in students their

own

responses to questions much like Cramton's, questions about themselves
as emergent lawyers. My goal is to teach students to ask themselves:
Who am I?
In my work as a lawyer, what will I be doing in the world?
What do I want to be doing in the world?

My aim is not to avow a particular set of answers

as

i:he truth,

nor

to

lead students to reach answers like mine, nor even to teach them the
relevant arguments in support of differing answers. It is rather to
the appropriateness of asking the questions, and to engage with
answers the questions call forth.

ment.

Teaching, to me, is evoking

Imparting information, whether about these

avo•.:v

whatever

that engage

questions or my

or

anyone else's answers to them, a fortiori about the law of Professional
Responsibility,
process,
tends to
13.

as

is a valuable part of teaching insofar as it tends to aid that

it often can; it is a positive interference with teaching when it

shut that

process down, as it often does.14

ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:

MITMENT JN AMERICAN LIFE
14.

295 (1985), quoted

lND!YlDUALlSivl AND ::=oM

in Penegar, supra note

12,

at 391 n.253.

It should be clear, therefore, that l am not denying my responsibility to o.ss�r-= stu

dents the means of learning "the law of lawyering" (or of any other subject I might

teach).

My

goal is that knowledge of the law be "imparted" as a by-product of the central enterprise de

scribed in the text, not for its own sake. My view is close to that articulated by Erwin Chemer

insky, Training the Ethical Lawyer: A Rejoinder

to

Schneyer. 1986 AM. B. ?OUl'iD. REs. J.
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What I have said is not meant to privilege responses that focus on
love or on God. I think of two colleagues, past and present, both rigor
ously secular in their avowals: one, a litigator and mentor of litigators,
who sees in lawyering a combative and potentially effective vehicle for
acting on feelings of outrage at the perpetrators, defenders, and benefi
ciaries of injustice; one, a student and critic of the contours of the sub
stantive law, who sees in law a means of holding individuals responsible
for their antisocial acts, in the name of their own personhood as well

as

of the protection of a concededly flawed social order. Through engage
ment with such teachers, students (and fellow teachers as well) can de
rive intellectual challenge, spiritual sustenance, and insight into their
own nascent visions of law as a vocation. There need not be any special
congruence between a student's vision and a teacher's. All that is needed
is for teachers to present their ideas as responses to fundamental ques
tions of identity and purpose, as aspects of themselves, and not only as
"legal" positions; and to do so not primarily to espouse or test the cor ·
rectness of their responses or the ability of students to contend over their
correctness, but to draw out-to educe-a similar process of self-defini
tion in their students. 1 5
I have drawn a contrast between the process of "engagement" and
the exchange of expositions or arguments in support of teachers' and stu
dents' presentations. That process of engagement is

a

relational, and not

merely an instrumental, interaction. Although it may contain, it is not
dominated by, a desire to affect another's world view.

In its noninstru

mental aspect, it seeks simply to present oneself authentically to the
other, and to the world; 1 6 in its instrumental aspect, it seeks to "impart"
to students an enhanced capacity to realize their own selfhood. The de
livery of tha t "tank of gas" is what teaching is to me. i 7
959. I have attempted t o make m y goal explicit, and to articulate its premises, i n the Introduc
tion to my coursebook, BEING A LAWYER: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND RESPONSJBILiTY IN
THE PRACTICE OF LAw (forthcoming 1992). (Some of what is written in that In:rcduction,
and in this paper, is a revision of portions of an earlier unpublished paper, excerpts of which
were quoted or paraphrased by Cramton, supra note 7, at 5 1 0- 1 3 . I hope thai my hospitality
to his words has not been influenced unduly by his earlier hospitality to mine).
1 5 . See the discussion, and accompanying references, regarding the idea of " i nvitation,"
in Howard Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on Per
s.oectives, 1991 DUKE L.J. 4 1 3 , 443, 452-54.
1 6. See the discussion in id. at 45 3-54.
1 7. Jack Sammons finds the thought expressed in the text too accepting of "the opinions,
aspirations, (and] j udgment" that students bring to us as teachers. In felicitous terms, he as
serts, ''the truth stands in judgment of both the student and the teacher, '· and (2tt1ibu ting the
words to Stanley Hauerwas) observes: "Kindness is not treating the other as he is, but treating
him as if he is capable of a good that he does not now possess, but is capab l e cf possessing . "
Letter from Jack L . Sa m mon s J r . , Professor o f Law, Mercer U n i versity, to Eo•t�ard Lesnick,
,

1 1 03
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·wh at are the implications of this theory of teachi n g 1 8 for the
teacher-practitioner reiation, that is, for the work of a teacher as it is
ori ented toward practicing lawyers, rather than law students (or fellow
teachers)? The short answer may be that most of us are happy to abj ure
that undertaking; academics tend to regard practitioners as providing a
terrain in which to "teach" that is as unwelcoming as it is infertile.

I

have no dispositive response to that answer, other than to note that the
"happiness" of many teachers, p a rti c ularl y those interested in the legal
representation of poor or otherwise disadvantaged people, with this state
of affairs is more than a little alloyed. I ndeed, this symposium is one (but

not the only) manifestation of a desire to find ways in which academics

can be more helpful as academics (that is, other than as participants in
litigation planning or brief-writing) to those who are actually "doing it. ' '
Recalling again that I a m here attempting t o articulate a theory o f teach
ing practitioners, I will say no more about the existence, present

or

po

tential, of a market for our talents.
IV1any academic l awyers share a desire to be of as sist an ce to lawy ers

for disempowered people in ways that go beyond the limitations of doc-
trinally or strategically oriented presentations, perceiving that such activ
ities,

although an undeniably worthy and useful contribution of

a

teacher's knowledge and skill, nonetheless fall seriously short of contrib
uting all that teachers have to offer. At its best, theoretical scholarship
addressed to the practice of law can be saliently powerful: Stephen "'vVex.

ler's landmark effort to reconceptualize " Practicing Law for Poor Peo
ple, " 19 and Peter Gabel and Paul Harris' attempt to bring the insights of
critical legal theory to bear on the practice of law, 20 are classic examples
Jefferson B . Fordham Professor of Law, Uni versity of Pennsylv;mia (Mar.
with the Hastings Law

20, 1 992\ (on

file

Journal).

I compietely agree with these insights, but believe that the processes of "engagement" and

·'invitation" thai I ha,;e sketched here are

dent's capacity to change.

a

legitimate and effective means of evoking a stu

For a brief discussion bearing on the q u e st io n whether such an

approach can escape the polar vices of disguised proselytizing and contentless "values clarifica
tion,"
an

see

Howard Lesnick, The

A iternatlve

18.

Integration of R esponsibility and Values: Legal Education in
Consciousness of La>')yering at�d Law, 1 0 NOVA L.J. 6 3 3 , 64 1 - 4 3 (19 86).

I take refuge in the f<1 ct til a t I am writing about "the theory of my pro.ctice," and not

the prac tice of my theory, to j ustify saying no more than I have about the very real difficulties,

risks, and pitfalls involved in attempting to implement the theCJry. I have chos�n to limit my

topic in this way i n order to overcome the tendency to express objection:' to a theory i n terms

of its p ract:i caliiy rather than to engage directly Vli t h its espousal as an aspiration. Proceeding
immediately t o engage with
lem-sc]vi n g lawyers,
difference

1. 9 .

20.

over

can

a

theory at the level of i rnpL:mentation, congenial

9.S

it is to pmb

lead to a "shadow" discussion, silen t l y shaped by an unackr10wledged

the 2�ppeal of the theory itself.

Skp;ten We;der, Practicing L a H ' fiJr Poor People. 7 9 Y A L E

L.J. 1 049 ( 1 970) .

Peter Gabe1 & Paul I-!arris. _Bu ilding Potver end .Breaking Irnages: C'ritica! Legal �Th c

o;:v und the .Practice

o/ L a w,

1 i N . Y . U . REV. L & Soc. C H A N G E 3 69

( 1 982-83).
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It is a truly heartening
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m omen t

m a grievou sly

disheartening world to see in the participants in this symposium a rising

generation of academic lawyers with insight, energy, and devotion. By
calling, in the name of the "teaching" of practitioners, for something dif
ferent from that genre, I am in no way denying its strengths and impor
tance.

I

am

not

seeking

to

supplant

what

theoretical

emergent

s cholarship is doing, but only to suggest that there may also be a place
for the conception of the teacher-student relation that I have attempted
to articulate here in the domain of practice as well as school.

The hazard of theoretically oriented presentations, inherent in their
very power, is that they have a tendency to be experienced by their ad
dressees--especially by practitioners-as critical of who they are, r ather
than of what at times they do or the ways in which they are accustomed
to think. Like most legal writing, such presentations tend to be prescrip
tive in their tone-what James Boyd White has felicitously termed,

" structurally coercive"2 1 -rather than sharing or disclosing the person of
the speaker, an d inviting one's hearers to "try on" a sonle">v:hat different

understanding of their work.
If we are to "invite" rather than "prescribe , " it is necessary not only
to present ourselves authentically, but also to meet others on their ovm
terrain. To do this requires that we be willing to engage with rather tha n

j udge

or

dismiss the existential realities of practice. vVe should not pre

sume that the inhospitality of many practitioners to "acade:rr1.i c" ideas is

simply a product of their unreflective or anti-intellectual mindset.

Con

sider some of the characteristics that many practitioners manifest :

an

impatience with "theoretical" notions la cking immediate payoff for the

job at hand; a reluctance to question established

of practice;

a

tendency to blame shortfalls on governmental and taxpayer hostility;

a

norrns

frustrating mix of inferiority and superiority about the choice (theirs and
ours) between teaching and practice; an amalgam of feelings of pride and
self-denigration in representing disvalued people and causes for egre

giously inadequate pay and other forms of recognition from the profes
sion; and a righteous refusal to question their own reliance on traditional
.
'
1
"
1
• 1 ,,
.
• c
of adversanness, so Wl'd e 1y used oy tne otner Si.Oe · w 1mensny

norms

the

'

o pp r e s s i o n

•

of their clients.

To "teach" practitioners would, in my conceptim1, b : to make this
array of responses a central part of the agenda rather

an

barrier to proceeding with it. It would, for exampl:;,

ac knov;l<::d g-
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ing and engaging directly with the fact that questioning the socialization
of the law office can undermine one's ability to present oneself as pre
pared and knowledgeable. It would seek at the same time to enhance
lawyers' awareness of the loss, as well as the gain, in allowing that exi
gency to control one's responses. In making that effort, this teaching
would be seeking to displace reflexive action with conscious choice,
neither dismissing barriers to change nor accepting without reflection the
dispositive character of those barriers.
As with the teacher-student and lawyer-client relations, the task,

as

I see it, is to keep the responsibility of teacher and practitioner shared.
The teacher's task is to strengthen the practitioner's experience of choice
in his or her work, while genuinely leaving the practitioner space to

e:xtr

..

cise that choice. Teacher and practitioner need one another, even though
each often experiences the other negatively. Practitioners, like all of
need teachers (as well as academic lecturers, co-counsel, and

us ,

critics),

if

they are to continue to grow, to keep striving to realize themselves in
their work, to hold at bay the experience of meaninglessness and �)l.::rn
out that laps at our feet in all that we do. But teachers need practiti c•ners
as well, to ground their thinking in the concrete settings in ·vvhidt :tt is
played out. Practitioners have the experience and the confidence to ;rro
vide a source of feedback that goes beyond what students
give us.

can

u�ms:Uy

And there is learning for the teacher even in the negative

inhospitable responses of practitioners, for just a s practitioners

·

can

cr

1ts.n.\

from teachers to open themselves to unacknowledged choice and res pon 
sibility, so can teachers benefit from what practitioners have to say nb):J1:
the limitations on choice.
I hop e that this glimpse of some ways in which "the theory c:f F.r:y
practice" as

a

teacher might be applicable to work that I would E 1,(e to d.o

with practitioners will strike a responsive chord among some tea·.�h,::: f 3.,
and some practitioners.

Even as theory, it stands in substantial r:�:ed t)F

further thou ght and articulation; and the challenges of implementa':icn
are formidable. Some will surely think the enterprise misguided c:oncc::p 
tually, or the difficulties of implementation so self-evidently dispositi",;:;:

.as

to justify disdaining the project. If, however, there are some wllD Ji:cj
what I have written resonant with their deepest aspirations for their �'iDrk
as a teacher, K ;,vould wekome the opportunity to explore vvifh

·j·i·:::

tasks of articulation and implementation. For in undertaking thes<'." -�ci.S1<:s,
I need colleagues. More than that, I need teachers.

